THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1976
Maris A. Vinovskis* t The halls of the United States Congress have reverberated throughout our history with noisy and emotional debates over divisive issues. Slavery, voting rights for women, and military involvement in Vietnam typify the problems that have frequently made political service difficult. Most representatives and senators are pragmatic politicians who feel very uncomfortable with any issue that divides the electorate into widely divergent factions that are unwilling or unable to compromise. Such issues can disrupt the normal conciliatory proceedings of Congress, creating hostility and bitterness among people who usually expect politeness, if not friendship, from their political opponents. After the Supreme Court legalized abortions in January 1973, members of the House and Senate found themselves with another volatile issue, one so fundamental that it drives antagonists to brand each other "murderers" and "baby-killers."
The battle over federal funds for abortions and the attempts to pass a constitutional amendment to prohibit all abortions have become annual events that most members of Congress privately dread but publicly welcome. As "pro-life" and "pro-choice" constituents descend upon their elected officials each year, representatives are forced to face an issue that has no easy legislative solution. 1 Despite the intensity and disruptiveness of these cont Funds for this project were provided by a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation. The analysis and opinions expressed in this paper are, of course, solely my own and do not reflect in any way the position or the views of the Foundation. I am also indebtedto Sally Brower and Mary Vinovskis for preparing and programming the data.
Portions of this analysis were presented at the annual meeting of the National Abortion Rights Action League in Washington, D.C., February 1978 and at the National Right to Life Convention in St. Louis, Missouri, July 1978.
1. The choice of words used to describe the opposing sides of the abortion debate is in itself controversial. For example, the use of the term "pro-life" to designate those who are against abortions is resented by their opponents because it implies that those who favor abortions are "anti-life." Rather than taking sides on this matter, I shall use the terms commonly utilized by each faction for themselves. Thus, those groups opposing abortions will be referred to as "pro-life" while those favoring abortions will be designated as "pro-choice." frontations, there have been no thorough and independent analyses of this phenomenon. Instead, most information on the abortion controversy in Congress has come from the understandably biased pens of the activists on both sides. Representatives and other policy makers are forced to make their decisions without fully understanding the political dynamics of the issue. This Article will try to remedy that lack of analysis by investigating the enactment by the House of restrictions on federal abortion funding. I will first describe the debates that preceded three important votes on abortion; I will then analyze those votes using multivariate statistical analysis.
J. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE HYDE AMENDMENT
During the debates on abortion in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress tried to remain aloof. In part, this reflected a feeling that abortion was a state matter and that federal intervention was unwarranted. Congress did declare in 1970 that abortions were not to be considered a form of family planning under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. No efforts were made, however, to prohibit the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortions in states, such as New York, with liberalized abortion laws.
The Supreme Court's sweeping decision in Roe v. Wade 2 persuaded pro-life activists to shift their efforts from the state to the federal level, and in particular to Congress. Legislators introduced bills in both houses of the 93d Congress to promote the prolife position, including proposals to permit individuals and institutions to refuse to perform abortions on grounds of conscience, to restrict federal funding of abortions, and to amend the Constitution to prohibit abortions. While a few of these efforts succeeded (individuals and institutions were exempted from performing abortions if abortions conflict with their consciences), most of these bills failed to pass either in the House or in the Senate, and amendments died in House-Senate conference. For example, the Senate passed a ban on the use of Labor-HEW funds for abortions except when "such abortions are necessary to save the life of the mother," but the House rejected it. In general, senators in the 93d Congress were more willing than representa-On the early developments in the efforts to liberalize abortion laws in the United States, see sources cited in Vinovskis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976: A Multivariate Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MrcH. L. REv. 1750 , 1751 n.4 (1979 .
2. 410 U. S. 113 (1973) . [Vol. 77:1790 tives to restrict or prohibit abortions, though most members of both chambers were disinclined to expend much time or energy on either side of the issue. 3 As the 94th Congress convened early in 1975, few observers expected it to enact any additional abortion legislation. The House seemed unwilling to budge from its determined opposition to restrictions on federal abortion funding and to a constitutional amendment limiting abortions. Most pro-life activists expected the Senate to lead the fight to restrict abortions, but early in the session those hopes were dashed. On April 10, 1975, the Senate reversed its position of the previous year by voting 54 to 36 to table Senator Dewey F. Bartlett's (R.-Oklahoma) amendment to bar federal funding of abortions under the Social Security Act.~ Although 1975 was a rather disappointing year for the prolife movement, its supporters looked forward to the federal and state campaigns in 1976 to elect officials more favorable to a constitutional amendment against abortions than those currently in office. The decision of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops to organize pro-life activity in each congressional district stimulated new efforts within Congress itself to force each senator and representative to take a public stand on abortion. Though most pro-life leaders still had little hope of passing a constitutional amendment in either the House or the Senate in 1976, they were determined to obtain at least a roll-call vote on abortion in both chambers. 5 The first major confrontation occurred in the Senate. On April 28, 1976, Senator Jesse A. Helms (R.-North Carolina) introduced a constitutional amendment to guarantee unborn children the right to life. In order to overcome the unwillingness of the Senate Judiciary Committee to report out any anti-abortion constitutional amendments, he introduced his measure as a Senate Resolution (S.J. Res. 178) -"With respect to the right of life guaranteed in this Constitution, every human being, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or of any State, shall be deemed, from the moment of fertilization, to be a person and entitled to the right of life. " 6 Following a bitter and emotional debate, the Senate voted, 47 to 40, to table the Helms resolution. 7 The pro-life Senators had suffered another defeat, but they were elated by the unexpected closeness of the vote. Eleven senators who had voted to table the Bartlett amendment the previous year, including such promipent leaders as Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Massachusetts), now voted against tabling. One pro-life observer put it:
A SENATE "DEFEAT" THAT WAS A STUNNING VICTORY, a whole new political situation, with all the proabortion contenders knocked out -a growing and organized abortion vote -it all adds up to the best news anti-abortion Americans have had since the nationwide struggle against abortion-ondemand started more than three years ago. 8
Following the success of the pro-life forces in obtaining a rollcall vote on abortion in the Senate, they tried to bring a similar measure to the floor of the House. As in the Senate, their attempts to offer an anti-abortion constitutional amendment were stymied whenever they were referred to one of the committees, 9 so pro-life representatives sought alternative means of getting their colleagues recorded on a roll-call abortion vote. Despite rumors that pro-life representatives might try to attach an abortion amendment to one of the appropriations bills, observers were startled when, on June 24, Representative Henry J. Hyde (R.-Illinois) offered an amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill for fiscal 1977:
None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used to pay for abortions or to promote or encourage abortions. 10
In support of his amendment, Hyde relied on the standard pro-life arguments. He contended that a human being is created at conception, a human that has at least the right to life. I think in the final analysis, you must determine whether or 4-not the unborn person is human. If you think it is animal or vegeta-7. Id. at 11,580. 8. Lifeletter, May 11, 1976 , at 1 (emphasis original). 9. Throughout the debates on the Hyde amendment, pro-choice representatives argued that an appropriations bill was not the proper vehicle for dealing with abortion; instead, they suggested that the matter be resolved in a debate and vote on a constitutional amendment to prohibit abortions. Most of these pro-choice advocates, however, were quite willing to see the anti-abortion constitutional amendments bottled up in the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and made no effort to bring those measures to the floor in order to provide a focus for the abortion debate other than the Labor-HEW appropriations bill. 10. 122 CoNG. REc. 20,410 (1976) . [Vol. 77:1790 ble then, of course, it is disposable like an empty beer can to be crushed and thrown out with the rest of the trash.
And if you believe that human life is deserving of due process of law -of equal protection of the laws, then you cannot in logic and conscience help fund the execution of these innocent defenseless human lives. 11
While some representatives opposing the Hyde amendment defended all abortions, others stressed the unfairness of denying abortions only to poor women. Representative Daniel J. Flood (D.-Pennsylvania), Chairman of the Labor-HEW Appropriations Subcommittee and a supporter of a constitutional amendment to prohibit abortions, pleaded with his colleagues to reject the Hyde amendment:
I oppose this amendment, and I will tell you why. Listen. This is blatantly discriminatory; that is why.
The Members do not like that? Of course they do not. It does not prohibit abortion. No, it does not prohibit abortion. It prohibits abortion for poor people. That is what it does. That is a horse of a different rolling stone. That is what it does. It does not require any change in the practice of the middle-income and the upperincome people. Oh, no. They are able to go to their private practitioners and get the service done for a fee. But, it does take away the option from those of our citizens who must rely on medicaid -and other public programs for medical care. 12 The argument that the Hyde amendment discriminates against poor women was to be repeated through the debates in Congress. Even the supporters of the Hyde amendment acknowledged that it was not the best way to deal with the issue, but they felt it was the only workable strategy at that time -especially since the pro-choice forces refused to allow a constitutional amendment to be placed before the full House for a vote. As Representative Robert E. Bauman (R.-Maryland) put it:
The gentleman [from Pennsylvania] raises an interesting, but I think answerable, point on the grounds that this would discriminate against poor people. The answer is that we have not been able to pass a constitutional amendment that would permit the right to life, regardless of poverty or wealth. But I do not understand that the child of a poor parent has any less right to live than the child of a rich parent. If we could protect the right to life for all children, we would do it. But the fact of the matter is, under 11. Id. 12. Id. medicaid and other programs that are financed in this bill, the Federal Government has been paying for more than 300,000 abortions annually at a cost of $40 to $50 million.
I think the unborn children whose lives are being snuffed out, even though they may not be adults have a right to live, too, regardless of the mistaken and immoral Supreme Court decision. I do not think the taxpayers of the United States have any obligation to permit their money to be used in this manner for federally financed abortions. That is the only issue here today. 13 Given the highly emotional nature of this issue, one might have expected a prolonged and bitter debate over abortion. Yet the initial discussions in the House over the Hyde amendment were unusually short. Perhaps this reflected the fact that many representatives were caught off-guard and were unprepared to join in the debate. Or perhaps most representatives ~ere reluctant to take a strong public position on abortion in an election year, when few of them expected the Hyde amendment to require a roll-call vote, much less to pass. 14 But the popular expectations were wrong. By a vote of207 to 167, the House accepted the Hyde amendment-a stunning and unexpected victory for the pro-life movement. Later that same day, Representative Bella S. Abzug (D.-New York) tried to reverse the earlier decision because she claimed that "[a] good number of Members who voted on this amendment indicated to us that they had not really understood the depth or the breadth of this amendment." 15 But by a vote of 199 to 165, the House upheld the Hyde amendment.
The stunned pro-choice groups regrouped and concentrated their lobbying on the Senate. The pro-life organizations, sensing victory, redoubled their efforts and besieged the senators with telephone calls and telegrams. On June 28, the struggle reached its climax. Senator Robert W. Packwood (R.-Oregon) moved to delete the Hyde amendment from the House version of the Labor-HEW appropriations bill. 16 After an attempt to table Packwood's motion failed by a vote of 55 to 27, the Senate voted 57 to 28 to strike the Hyde amendment from the bill. Compared to the nar-13. Id. at 20,411. 14. When Representative Bauman had tried to attach an amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill for fiscal 1976 that would have ended federal funding of abortions, he was defeated on a voice vote. When he called for a recorded vote on the issue, he failed to muster the necessary 20 votes to obtain a roll-call vote. Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, July 11, 1975 , at 2-3. 15. 122 CoNG. R.Ec. 20,423 (1976 . 16. Id. at 20,881.
[Vol. 77:1790 row pro-choice victory over the Helms constitutional amendment two months earlier, the defeat of the Hyde amendment was much more decisive. In part, the larger margin reflected the unwillingness of some senators to accept the language that would not have permitted federal funds for abortions when the life of the mother was endangered. The stage was now set for a confrontation between representatives and senators over a politically and emotionally explosive issue that most members of both chambers privately wished had nev~r arisen during an election year. Congress had faced a similar situation in 1974. In that year, however, it was the Senate that had attached an anti-abortion amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill and the House that had rejected it. Whe:Q the House-Senate conferees met, they had agreed to drop the amendment and rationalized their decision by stating that an annual appropriation bill is an improper vehicle for such a controversial and far-reaching legislative provision whose implications and ramifications are not clear, whose constitutionality has been challenged, and on which no hearings have been held. The rules and traditions of both the House and the Senate militate against the inclusion of legislative language in appropriations bills. 17 Yet 1976 was quite different from 1974. Abortion had rarely been mentioned in congressional campaigns in 1974, but it was highly visible in both the presidential and congressional contests in 1976. 18 In the summer and fall of 1976, most politicians were uncertain about the importance of the abortion issue to voters. 10 Furthermore, during the deliberations of the 93d Congress, members did not hear much about abortion from their constituents; members of the 94th Congress, however, were bombarded with mail and petitions from both sides. 20 The House-Senate conferees in 1976 no longer felt they could duck the abortion issue by simply arguing that such a rider was not germane to an appropriations bill.
The House-Senate conferees were under great pressure to settle their differences on the Labor-HEW appropriations bill for fiscal 1977 quickly, as fiscal 1976 was about to end and new funds 17. H.R. REP. No. 1489 , 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974 . 18. Rosoff, supra note 3. 19. Vinovskis, supra note 1. 20. During the fall of 1976, I visited the offices of 25 representatives and discussed the abortion issue with the congressmen or their staffs. Most of them indicated that their mail from the pro-life forces was much heavier than that from the pro-choice side.
would be needed to keep these agencies in operation. Nevertheless, neither the House nor the Senate conferees felt that they could back down, since their colleagues were afraid of antagonizing supporters over the abortion issue just before the election. Therefore, though the conferees could resolve seventy-five of the seventy-six amendments in disagreement between them, they were unable to settle their differences on abortion; as a result, the Hyde amendment was sent back to both chambers for reconsideration.
When the House took up the Labor-HEW appropriations bill on August 10, it readily accepted the conference report by a vote of 279 to 100. 21 Though some thought that the House might recede from its insistence on the Hyde amendment, it soon became evident that the pro-life camp would not only maintain its majority, but would even increase it. Representative Flood, for instance, reversed his previous opposition to the Hyde amendment: I was concerned that this amendment might be interpreted as prohibiting medicaid funds from being used to terminate pregnancies, which might be necessary in some cases to save a mother's life. This would be unfair to people who are unable to pay the very high costs of medical care which prevail today. I have been persuaded that this problem would not be as serious as it might appear, and that the therapeutic and medical services that might be necessary and advised could be paid for by State, local, or private funds. 22 While pro-life speakers tried to minimize the Hyde amendment's termination of federal funds for poor women whose lives were endangered by their pregnancies, the pro-choice spokesmen emphasized it. When Representative Joel M. Pritchard (R.-W ashington) moved to concur with the Senate version of the Labor-HEW appropriations bill, which did not restrict federal funds for abortions, he appealed to those representatives who favored abortions in some instances but were politically afraid of the pro-lifers in their districts.
Then there is a third group in this House who, I believe, think that abortions are all right in some cases, but they are very, very worried about voting at this time, just several months before the election.
Some may feel that this vote will not be recorded or will not be known. Even though they admit that in their districts the ma- [Vol. 77:1790 jority of people support abortion and allowing women to make this decision -they also realize that a very hard and very skillful minority is working very hard -which is their right -and they are afraid that they will be punished at the polls. 23 Following a much longer and more spirited debate than the one two months before, the House defeated Pritchard's motion by a vote of 223 to 150. The 73-vote difference on Pritchard's motion signaled a sizable increase in House support for the pro-life position and made any attempts to compromise the issue with the Senate more difficult. On August 25, however, the Senate rejected the Hyde amendment and insisted on its own version of the bill by a vote of 53 to 35. 24 Nevertheless, pro-choice strength in the Senate eroded, as five senators switched from a June 28 prochoice vote to an August 28 pro-life vote.
With the House and Senate again deadlocked, the conferees reconvened to seek a compromise that would be acceptable to a majority in both houses. The stalemate was finally broken when Representative Silvio 0. Conte (R.-Massachusetts) persuaded his fellow House conferees to accept a revised version of the amendment, one he hoped would appease the senators:
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. 25 At first, the senators were reluctant to accept Conte's wording. Senator Edward W. Brooke (R.-Massachusetts), one of the leaders of the pro-choice effort in the Senate, offered several changes to weaken the Conte proposal even further. But Brooke's efforts were in vain and the Senate conferees accepted Conte's amendment by a vote of 10 to 5. 26 On September 16, the House took up the Labor-HEW appropriations bill again. Since both houses had already accepted the conference report on everything except the Hyde amendment, the only issue before the House was the disagreement over abortion. Representative Flood urged his colleagues to accept the compromise wording drafted by Conte as the only reasonable way to settle the impasse and enact the $56 billion appropriations bill for fiscal 1977, whose start was only 23 fifteen days away. 27 The House ultimately accepted the conference report by a vote of 256 to 114. 28 The next day, the Senate concurred by a vote of 47 to 21. 29 Thus, the long and bitter battle over abortion had finally ended with a major victory for the prolife movement.
II. PATIERNS OF VOTING ON THE HYDE AMENDMENT IN THE HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES
Throughout the debate over the Hyde amendment in 1976, analysts of Capitol Hill maneuvering tried to account for its unexpected success in the House of Representatives. Their explanations of the voting behavior of the representatives were often colored by their own views on abortion. For example, while prochoice analysts emphasized the importance of religion in determining a representative's vote, with Catholic representatives allegedly spearheading the antiabortion effort, pro-lifers denied the importance of religion and pointed to the Protestant representatives who supported the Hyde amendment.
One reason for the difficulty in assessing the relative importance of various factors in congressional voting is that all of the analyses of the Hyde amendment have relied on a simple crosstabulation of the data. These analyses calculate the percentage of Republicans and Democrats voting for the Hyde amendment or the proportion of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews supporting it, but they do not try to estimate the relative importance of each of these factors after controlling for the effects of the other characteristics of the representatives and their constituents. 311 By failing to use multivariate techniques, most studies of congressional voting on the Hyde amendment are too limited to provide an accurate explanation of the voting pattern.
In this analysis I examine the determinants of representatives' votes on the Hyde amendment on June 24, August 10, and September 16, 1976. The dependent variable in each case is whether a representative supported or opposed the Hyde amendment on that particular roll-call vote. 31 To compute independent 27. 122 CONG. REc. 30,895-96 (1976 Abortion: How Members Voted in 1977 , CONG. Q., Feb. 4, 1978 . In order to include as many representatives on each roll-call vote as possible, those who supported the Hyde amendment included not only those who voted for it, but [Vol. 77:1790 variables, we assembled data on about 100 different factors for each representative, but narrowed our final set of predictors to eleven. Four of the independent variables describe the representatives' personal characteristics: age, education, sex, and religion. Three variables describe representatives' political lives: their party affiliation, the political situation in their district as of October 9, 1976, and their index of voting on other issues in the House. The last four independent variables describe the constituents of the representatives' home districts: the percentage of the population living in urban or suburban areas, the percentage of constituent families with annual income less than $3,000, the percentage of constituents who are black, Spanish, ·or Indian, and the region of the country. Though we used additional independent variables in some of the analyses, these eleven variables were the core of the investigation. 32 To avoid the limitations of looking at only one or two variables at a time to explain the vote on the Hyde amendment, we used multiple classification analysis (MCA). Multiple classification analysis permits us to analyze the relative importance of each of the independent variables while controlling for the effects of the other variables. Multiple classification analysis also allows us to examine the relationship between each subcategory of an independent variable (such as the subcategories "Methodists" and "Catholics" of the independent variable "religion") and the vote on the Hyde amendment after taking the other factors into consideration. 33 also those who were paired for or announced for it (though the latter two were usually very few in number). Similarly, those who opposed the Hyde amendment included not only those who voted against it, but also those who were paired against or announced against it. Unfortunately, since we did not have enough information on the personal, political, and constituent characteristics of all representatives, a few of them were not included in the analysis even though we know how they voted on the Hyde amendment. Several additional runs with the missing data were made to see whether any serious biases were introduced by these procedures; the results indicate that the MCA runs reported in this paper are representative of general pattern of actual voting behavior on the Hyde amendment.
On June 24 there were two roll-call votes on the Hyde amendment. Since the second one was an attempt by Representative Abzug to convince her colleagues to reconsider their previous vote (though very few of them actually changed their vote), we used the second vote; if, however, a representative had not participated at all on the second roll-call vote, his position on the first roll-call vote was used. 32. Many of the other independent variables, such as whether a representative was black or white, could not be used in the final MCA runs because there was such a large overlap between it and some other independent variable.
33. For a more thorough discussion of the use of multiple classification analysis, see my description of it in any other essay in this collection. Vinovskis, supra note 1, at 1764-65.
We will consider the relationship between each of the eleven independent variables and the vote on the Hyde amendment for the three different occasions that produced a roll-call vote in the House. As I noted above, the pro-life forces steadily gained strength, from 54% on June 24 to 58% on August 10 to 69% .on September 16. Part of the difference between the first two and the last, of course, may be explained by the changes in the language of the amendment to permit federal funding of abortions when the life of the mother is endangered. The changes in voting over that period, however, may also reflect a decision of pro-choice representatives to accommodate themselves to the pressure from the pro-life activists in their districts. Therefore, in the balance of this Article I will discuss each explanatory variable individually and note any exceptional changes in predictive power between votes.
Our first independent variable was the age of the representative. In the general population, young adults are usually more pro-choice than older Americans. 34 Among the representatives, the pattern is more complex. Representatives under forty or over seventy were the most likely to support the Hyde amendment, but votes varied little with age until representatives passed seventy. This pattern held even after we controlled for the effects of the other independent variables (see figure 1 ).' 0verall, the age of the representatives was only a moderate predictor of their voting behavior (see the beta weights in tables 2, 4, and 6 in Appendix A).
Among the general population pro-life and pro-choice Americans show significant differences in level of education. The more educated one is, the more likely one is to support the pro-choice position. Thus, while 74% of those with a grade school education disapproved of the legalization of abortions for mothers who simply want no more children, only 42% of those with a college education disapproved. 35 Any relationship between education and support for the Hyde amendment in Congress is complicated by the fact that almost every representative has either attended or graduated from college. Therefore, we subdivided the representatives by whether they had had at least some college training or a B. whether the educational level of the representative could not be ascertained. One might hypothesize that those representatives who had training beyond the B.A. would be less likely to support the Hyde amendment and that those with some legal training would be the least likely to support it since the constitutionality of the amendment was being questioned.
Representatives with education beyond a B.A. were indeed less likely to support the Hyde amendment than those with just some college training or a B.A. -even after we controlled for the other variables (see figure 2 ). Although in some situations legally trained representatives were more apt to oppose the Hyde amendment than those with nonlegal education beyond the B.A., in other situations the reverse was true -probably indicating that the constitutionality of the Hyde amendment was never as questionable to all laWYer-representatives as the pro-choice supporters implied during the debates on abortion. After controlling for other factors, the educational level of a representative usually was not as good a predictor of voting behavior as age. One frequent complaint from the pro-choice people throughout the debates on the Hyde amendment was that a legislative body composed almost entirely of men was making decisions that denied women the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion. They portrayed the Hyde amendment as the imposition of male values on powerless poor women. Several representatives and senators clearly implied that if Congress had a higher proportion of female members, the Hyde amendment would have been defeated. Thus, Representative Pritchard observed: "Finally, Mr. Speaker, if we had had 17 men and the rest of them were women, then both of us know that there would be a different discussion made today on this decision. " 36 In the general population women are actually more negative about abortions than men, though the difference is quite small. 3 ; In the House, however, female representatives were much more apt to vote against the Hyde amendment than their male counterparts. For example, 55.3% of male representatives supported the Hyde amendment on June 24 and only 27 .8% of female representatives endorsed it. Yet after we controlled for the effects of the other variables, the differences between male and female representatives were considerably narrower (see figure 3 ). In other words, though female representatives were more likely to vote against the Hyde amendment than male representatives, it was due to many factors other than gender. As a result, it is not clear that if more women were elected to the House, especially from the more conservative districts, they would be any more likely to oppose restrictions on federal funding of abortions than the men who occupy those seats today.
Women are powerful in both the pro-life and pro-choice movements. One of the difficulties some pro-choice advocates have encountered on the Hill is that many male representatives feel rather uncomfortable with female activists who do not outwardly conform to the more traditional role of women in our society. 38 As a result, though women are prominent and active in both movements, those in the pro-life effort, who tend to accept a more traditional image and role for women in society, are often more personally acceptable to their congressmen than their counterparts in the pro-choice group. 38. When I discussed the relative effectiveness of the lobbyists from the pro-choice and pro-life sides with 25 congressional offices, most of the respondents, including th6se who voted against the Hyde amendment, felt that the tactics of the pro-lifers were more effective; several people mentioned that pro-choice lobbyists were often handicapped because they did not fit the stereotype of the traditional American woman.
One of the most controversial aspects of the debates over abortion is the role of religion in promoting pro-life activitiesparticularly the involvement of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, most pro-choice activists stress the importance of the Catholic Church and clergy in mobilizing support for the pro-life efforts. The most extreme pro-choice activists see the entire antiabortion effort directed and financed by the Catholic Church with only token Protestant and Jewish participation. On the other hand, pro-lifers are very uneasy and often quite resentful whenever the religious issue is raised. Some deny the active participation of the Catholic Church while others try to justify its involvement. fu any.case, most pro-life supporters feel that the importance of the Catholic Church has been deliberately exaggerated by their pro-choice opponents to discredit and discourage any further pro-life activity among Catholics and to rally Protestant and Jewish support for the pro-choice side.
During the debates on the Hyde amendment in the 94th Congress, the Catholic Church and many of its clergymen were actively encouraging their parishioners to support efforts to restrict or prohibit abortions. Following the guidelines of the "Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities" adopted by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in November 1975, the Church hoped to organize Catholics in every congressional district who could persuade their officials to support pro-life positions.= 19 Rather than trying to deny the involvement of the Catholic Church in pro-life efforts, Monsignor James McHugh, Director of the pro-life activities for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, defended it: "I think every church has a right to use its political muscle and its political expertise to try to persuade the rest of the society to adopt the views that they find consonant with their faith and belief, and consonant with the political philosophy of the country itself." 40 But McHugh did go on to deny that the Catholic Church tries to engage directly in any political activity:
We encourage those things happening, but we do not consider that those are uniquely the role of the church. The church stops . . . in the public policy area with pronouncements, with encouragement, with clarifying issues, with perhaps even testifying before Congress. But we do not think that the church or her agencies 39. Vinovskis, supra note 1. 40. Transcript of CBS News program, "The Politics of Abortion" (aired April 22, 1978) , at 16. [Vol. 77:1790 should be involved in this congressional district activity, in this election of candidates, in this endorsement of one candidate over another. We enumerated those things because those are the kinds of activity that we feel citizens themselves should engage in, and we were certainly trying to encourage our Catholic citizens to work into the political order. 41
The pro-choice spokespeople agree with McHugh's statement that the Catholic Church is trying to influence its parishioners to support efforts such as the Hyde amendment, but they strongly disagree with his contention that the Church and its clergymen have stopped short of direct political involvement such as soliciting contributions or distributing pro-life literature. 42 In any case, the real question is not whether the Catholic Church and its supporters participated in the efforts to enact the Hyde amendment, directly or indirectly, but whether they were influential -particularly among the Catholic representatives.
Catholic representatives were much more likely to support the Hyde amendment than their Protestant or Jewish counterparts. For example, 74.7% of Catholic representatives endorsed the Hyde amendment on June 24 and only 51.2% of the Presbyterian, 57.1% of the Methodist, 55.3% of the Baptist, 42.5% of the Episcopalian, and 10.5% of the Jewish representatives voted for it. Thus, as the pro-choice side has argued, representatives of different religions showed significant differences in level of support for the Hyde amendment. 43 But did the differences between Catholic and non-Catholic representatives on the Hyde amendment disappear after we controlled for the effects of the other variables? Did the religion of a representative really influence his vote, or were the patterns described above merely coincidental? After we controlled for the effects of other attributes of the representatives, the differences in voting behavior between Catholic and non-Catholic representatives not only persisted, but substantially increased (see figure  4 ). Catholic representatives were much more likely to vote for 41. Id. at 17. 42. For example, see Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Sept. 17, 1976, at 1-3; National Abortion Rights Action League Newsletter, Sept, 1976, at 8-7. 43. Though we do have the religious affiliations of the representatives, we do not have any information on other aspects of their religious orientations. For example, it would be useful to know which representatives consider themselves evangelical or even which ones regularly attend church. If we had additional information about religious belief's and practices, religion might be an even better predictor of voting behavior on the Hyde amendment than simply knowing their religious affiliations. restricting federal funds for abortions than Protestant or Jewish representatives. In fact, after controlling for the effects of the other variables, religion was the second best predictor of how someone voted on the Hyde amendment. Though this analysis confirms the existence of a link between religion and support for the Hyde amendment it must be interpreted in light of another fact -there are not enough Catholic representatives in the House or Senate to account alone for the success of the Hyde amendment. On June 24, Catholics constituted only about one third of those who voted for the Hyde amendment. If the Protestant representatives had not split almost equally on the issue, the Hyde amendment would never have passed; only the Jewish representatives were solidly opposed to the Hyde amendment and they are too few to offset the strong support from Catholic representatives. Moreover, although the religious affiliation of a representative is unquestionably a major predictor of how that person voted on the Hyde amendment in 1976, it is still not clear what effect pressure from the Catholic Church had. Our analysis cannot explain whether the greater likelihood of Catholic representatives voting for the Hyde amendment was due to their personal religious values and convictions about abortion or to a special respect for the views of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
So far we have considered the effects of four personal characteristics of the representatives on their votes on the Hyde amendment; now we turn to some political factors -their political affiliation, their political prospects as of October 9, 1976, and their index of liberalism on other issues as measured by the percentage of times they voted with the recommendations of the Americans for Democratic Action. Many representatives, particularly those in the pro-choice camp, lamented that the Hyde amendment had become such a controversial political issue and urged their colleagues to vote on the basis of its moral and health implications rather than its political consequences. As Representative Pritchard put it: "I do not believe that the majority of the Members favor this amendment. This is not a time to be political, it is a time to be concerned with the health of this Nation."H Nevertheless the political consequences of voting for or against the Hyde amendment were never far from the thoughts of most representatives.
Party affiliation appears to be a very strong predictor of how representatives voted on the Hyde amendment. Though Republicans in the general population tend to be more pro-choice than Democrats, Republican representatives were much more likely to vote to restrict federal funding of abortions than their Democratic counterparts. While 73.6% of the Republican representatives voted for the Hyde amendment, only 43.9% of the Democrats supported it. Given that large difference in support, some commentators have seen this as a party issue, particularly since the party platforms and presidential nominees in 1976 also divided along party lines on the abortion issue. 45 Yet after we controlled for the effects of the other variables, the differences between Republicans and Democrats not only disappeared, but on two of the 44. 122 CONG. REC. 26,783 (1976) . 45. See Vinovskis, supra note 1. three roll-call votes Democrats were now slightly more likely to favor the Hyde amendment than Republicans (see figure 5 ). Though party affiliation by itself seemed to be a strong predictor of voting behavior on abortion, after we controlled for other factors it became relatively unimportant. One might suspect that the representatives who faced particularly difficult reelection battles would be more concerned about the political effects of their Hyde amendment votes than those who were not running for-reelection or who did not face stiff reelection fights. To evaluate the political situation of each representative, we relied upon the evaluation of the House campaigns as of October 9, 1976, in the Congressional Quarterly, which is acknowledged by most Capitol Hill observers as one of the most accurate surveys of congressional campaigns. 46 First, we classified the representatives by whether or not they were running for reelection as of October 9, 1976. Among those who were not returning, we distinguished those who had decided 46. CONG. Q., Oct. 9, 1976 , Supplement. [Vol. 77:1790 to abandon electoral politics completely from those who were seeking another office, had already been defeated in a primary, or had died in office by October 9. We hypothesized that those who had decided to retire completely from electoral politics would be less likely to be influenced by outside pressure groups than those who had left the House for another position, had been running for reelection earlier and then lost their primary, or had died in office (there were very few representatives who had lost in a primary fight for reelection or died in office). One must be rather careful in drawing general conclusions from the few individuals not returning. The incumbents seeking reelection were subdivided into three categories -those whose reelection seemed assured, those whose reelection was likely but not certain, and those whose reelection was in considerable doubt as of October 9. An overwhelming percentage of House members up for reelection were from safe districts and therefore we expected them to be more politically able to vote their individual consciences on the Hyde amendment than their colleagues facing difficult reelection campaigns.
When we controlled for the effects of other variables, the representatives leaving the House usually were much more likely to oppose the Hyde amendment than those who were running for reelection (see figure 6 ). Even those who were leaving the House to seek another elected office were more likely to oppose restrictions on federal funding of abortions than those who were engaged in difficult reelection fights -particularly on the votes of June 24 and September 16. In every situation, the representatives who were retiring from electoral politics altogether opposed the Hyde amendment more than any of their colleagues.
After we controlled for the effects of the other variables, we found representatives l')seeking reelection from safe districts more likely to support the Hyde amendment than their colleagues, though the differences were not very sizable. The puzzling thing about the results is that the two sets of representatives supposedly the most immune from outside pressure, those retiring from electoral politics altogether and those in safe districts, responded in opposing ways to the Hyde amendment. Perhaps this is a function of a small number of cases we have for the representatives who are retiring from politics altogether, which may have produced statistically unstable results. Or perhaps even though outside observers considered a district safe, the representative running for reelection was still very concerned about pro-choice and RETIRING ., While most commentators on the Hyde amendment have studied the religious and political affiliations of the representatives, few have speculated about the association between their pattern of voting on other issues and the way they voted on cutting federal funds for abortions. From time to time, the pro-choice side has chided pro-life representatives for not supporting federally funded family planning programs or for not voting additional money for helping teenage mothers, but not even these pro-choice critics have seen the abortion battle as one between conservatives and liberals. In fact, many pro-choice activists expect support from conservatives since both groups should be able to agree on the necessity of removing any government interference with what they see as part of the private lives of women.
Hyde Amendment
To test whether there is a relationship between voting for the Hyde amendment and one's position on other issues, it is useful to have a measure of voting behavior that identifies a representative's place on the political spectrum. We used as our index of liberalism the percentage of times representatives voted with the 47. Congressmen from safe districts are often very concerned about future challenges to them. For an excellent discussion of the way representatives perceive their constituents and reelection campaigns, see R. FENNo, HoME STYLE: HousE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS (1978) . [Vol. 77:1790 recommendations of the Americans for Democratic Action (removing, of course, the vote on the Hyde amendment from the rollcall votes used to compute the ADA index). We also used several other indices of political orientation, including those put out by the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education, the National Farmers Union, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Americans for Constitutional Action, in different MCA runs and we had results very similar to those produced by using the ADA index. ~8
The addition of an index of liberalism produced dramatic results: A representative's index of liberalism was the single best predictor of voting behavior on the Hyde amendment. Even after controlling for other factors, representatives who voted with the recommendations of the ADA less than twenty-five percent of the time were three or four times as likely to vote for the Hyde amendment as those who agreed with the ADA position at least seventy-five percent of the time (see figure 7) . Thus, despite what one might infer from the remarks of the news media and Capitol Hill observers, a representative's overall liberalism is a much better predictor of the vote on restricting federal funds for abortions than any other variable, including the representative's religious affiliation.
This conservative-liberal split on abortion funding places many pro-life representatives in an awkward position. On the one hand, they argue that abortions should not be used as a substitute for family planning and that pregnant women should be helped by private and public agencies to care for their unborn child so that they will not need to resort to an abortion. In fact, the prolife position stresses the value of the mother and her child in our society and seeks to encourage couples to have children rather than abortions. On the other hand, since pro-life representatives tend to be more conservative than their pro-choice counterparts, they are reluctant to vote for higher federal spending for programs designed to prevent unwanted pregnancies or to assist pregnant women. On the same day that the House first enacted the Hyde amendment, it rejected an amendment by Representative James H. Scheuer (D.-New York) to increase family planning funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. 4 a Those representatives who voted for the Hyde amendment were much more likely to vote against the Scheuer amendment than 48. These indices are available in CONG. Q., Feb. 5, 1977 , at 222. 49. 122 CONG. REc. 20,396 (1976 . those who opposed the Hyde amendment, after we controlled for the effects of the other variables. 50 Thus, many pro-life representatives had to explain to their constituents why they opposed higher levels of funding for family planning programs at the same time that they were cutting off federal funds for abortions for poor women who did not want ·any more children.
Finally, we considered the impact of some of the characteristics of constituents in a congressional district on the way that representative voted on the Hyde amendment. Unfortunately, some of the constituents' characteristics that may be most influential -such as the religious affiliation of the voters -are not tabulated at the level of the congressional district. But we do have information at the district level from the 1970 census on the percentage of constituents living in urban or suburban areas, the percentage of families with incomes less than $3000, the percentage of voters who are black, Spanish, or Indian, and the region 50. Based on my unpublished MCA investigation of the determinants of voting on the Scheuer amendment. [Vol. 77:1790 of the country in which the district is situated. 51 Therefore, we analyzed the significance of those factors.
Representatives from rural areas were more likely to support the Hyde amendment than representatives from the urban areas. While 63.3% of the representatives who had less than twenty-five percent of their constituents in urban or suburban areas voted for the Hyde amendment on June 24, only 45.3% of those with at least seventy-five percent of their constituents in urban or suburban areas voted for it. These differences, however, largely disappeared when we controlled for the effects of the other variables (see figure 8 ). Since the Hyde amendment ended federally funded abortions for poor women, one might expect that representatives with a high proportion of low-income constituents would have been more likely to oppose it. Though this was generally true, we were surprised to find that after we controlled for the effects of the other variables, the strongest support for the Hyde amendment on June 24 and August 10 came from those districts with at least twenty percent of their families having a yearly income of less than $3000 (see figure 9 ). This variable, like the previous one, was 51 The higher the proportion of nonwhite constituents, the more likely the representative was to vote against the Hyde amendment. Though controlling for the effects of the other factors compressed the differences somewhat, the general pattern remained the same (see figure 10 ). Compared to other variables, this one was a moderately strong predictor of voting behavior on the Hyde amendment.
During the debates on restricting federal funds for abortions, pro-life advocates often charged those who favored abortions for poor black women with genocide. As Representative Hyde argued:
All of us should have a particular sensitivity to the concept of the word genocide. In New York City, last year for every 1,000 minority births, there were 1,304 minority abortions. That is one way to get rid of the poverty problem, get rid of poor people. Let us call that pooricide. 52 Nevertheless, though the pro-life activists openly appealed for support from the black representatives and those with a high proportion of nonwhite constituents, they failed to make any significant inroads. The black representatives rejected attempts to end federal funding of abortions as discriminatory against poor women -many of whom were black. As Representative Parren J. Mitchell (D.-Maryland) observed:
Clearly then, if the proponents of this legislation are against abortion then it is not appropriate for them to prohibit the access to abortions for only one class of people. I abhor this type of victimization. This legislation will only approve inequities in the constitutional rights of our citizens and increase the disparity that already exists among white and black, rich and poor, the economically and socially advantaged and disadvantaged. 53 Overall, the eleven independent variables could account for about one third of the variation in voting behavior on the Hyde amendment. Compared to other attempts to exlain voting patterns using multiple classification analysis and as many independent variables, this is a reasonable and satisfactory level of explanation, particularly since information on some potentially important factors such as the religious affiliation of constituents was unavailable to us.
ill. CONCLUSION
When the 94th Congress reconvened in January 1976, almost no one predicted that the pro-life forces would succeed in passing an amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill to cut off federal funds for abortions except when the life of the mother was endangered. Perhaps even more surprising was that the leadership and impetus for this effort cam~ from the House of Representatives rather than the Se_nate, since in the 93d Congress the House had been firmly opposed to most pro-life legislation. It is difficult to explain the sudden success of the pro-life effort in the House. Though many representatives genuinely thought that the Supreme Court had gone too far in its legalization of all abortions in the first six months, subject only to state health regulations in the second trimester, most of them did not feel very strongly about the abortion issue. In fact, many representatives acknowledged the complexity of the abortion question and privately admitted that they wished Congress had never become embroiled [Vol. 77:1790 in the Hyde amendment controversy. Yet a small group of persuasive zealots in the House was able to force their reluctant colleagues to take a recorded stand on abortion in an election year.
The success of the pro-life movement is certainly related to the uncertainty of most representatives and most other observers about the importance of the abortion controversy to the electorate. Though most representatives were not in any real danger of being defeated for reelection, they did not want to take any chances by triggering an emotional pro-life crusade against themselves in their districts. The pro-life forces were particularly effective at the local level, thanks in part to the active support and encouragement of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops through its Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities. Some of the success of the pro-lifers at the grass-roots level reflected the inability of their pro-choice counterparts to mount an equally effective political effort at the level of the congressional district, partly because the pro-choice advocates concentrated their attention more on national than local lobbying and partly because they had great difficulty in arousing their followers to wage as fervent a fight on abortion as the pro-lifers did.
When the representatives placed their plastic cards in the voting slots to record their votes on the Hyde amendment, they were certainly aware of the political pressures from both sides. Furthermore, they overestimated the political saliency of the abortion issue by assuming that the emotional intensity among the activists in some way reflected the feelings of the general public on abortion. Though these outside pressures in an election year were undoubtedly necessary ingredients for the pro-life victory in the House, they still do not explain why some representatives responded positively to the Hyde amendment while others chose to oppose it. ·
The personal values and attitudes of representatives about abortion certainly played a major role in their final decisions. This analysis suggests that representatives who generally tended to be more conservative on other social issues or who were brought up as Catholics were much more likely to favor restricting federal funds for abortions than those who were generally more liberal or raised in a Protestant or Jewish environment. Since most representatives did not care enough about abortion to make it their personal crusade in the House in 1975, one is led to suspect that while personal values and characteristics predisposed representatives to respond in certain ways once the abortion issue was forced upon them, left to themselves they would have never pushed to cut off federal funds from abortions. APPENDIX A .0011
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